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TORTS-The Illinois Wrongful Death Act Held Inapplicable
to a Viable Fetus.
The complex issues raised by a wrongful death action for the estate
of a viable fetus1 were first raised in Illinois when an automobile
operated by Richard and Herbert Brandenberg struck Domna Chris-
afogeorgis. At the time of the accident, Mrs. Chrisafogeorgis was
thirty-six weeks pregnant with Baby Boy Chrisafogeorgis. During the
emergency surgery that followed the accident, Baby Boy was stillborn.
Two actions were subsequently brought in the Circuit Court of Cook
County against the Brandenbergs. Mrs. Chrisafogeorgis brought the
first action in her own name to recover damages for the injuries that
she suffered in the accident. Mr. Chrisafogeorgis brought the second
action as personal representative for Baby Boy's estate under the Illi-
nois Wrongful Death Act. At trial the defendants first answered the
complaint and later moved for summary judgment as to the second
count. The trial court granted this motion. On appeal to the appel-
late court for the First District, the court, by Mr. Justice Lorenz, held
in favor of the defendants. The court found that the Illinois Wrongful
Death Act does not impose liability on one who causes a viable fetus
to be stillborn, for a fetus must be born alive before it can attain the
legal personality required to achieve the status of a "person" under the
statute.
2
Before comment can be given to the instant decision, two questions
must be posed and examined so that the fullest possible understanding
of the legal personality of a viable fetus can be had: first, what recog-
nition has been given to the legal rights of an unborn viable child out-
side the area of tort law; second, what is the general purpose of tort
law and how does the wrongful death statute further this general pur-
pose.
NON-TORT RECOGNITION OF THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF A VIABLE FETUS
The common law conferred substantial standing on the fetus, yet it
cannot be said that the common law recognized prenatal life as full
1. A viable fetus is one capable of living independently from the mother. This
capability arises after six and one-half to seven months of pregnancy. STIAM's
MEDICAL DIcTIoNARY (2d ed., 1966).
2. 3 Ill. App. 3d 422 (1972). Illinois Wrongful Death Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
70, secs. 1 and 2 (1971).
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human life. Real property was the first branch of the law to grant
rights to the fetus. British courts as early as 17951 construed the word
"children" in a will to include a life existing in the womb. In holding
that an unborn life was a life in being -under the rule against perpetui-
ties, another English court listed some of the rights of the fetus.4 The
court stated:
He may be vouched in a recovery, though it is for the purpose of
making him answer over in value. He may be an executor. He
may take under the Statute of Distributions. . . . He may take
by devise. He may be entitled under a charge for raising por-
tions. He may have an injunction; and he may have a guardian.5
American courts followed the common law rules concerning the
property rights of the fetus. In a leading case, a Massachusetts court
held the term "living" to encompass any life merely conceived. 6 The
life only needed to be in esse; it did not even need to have "quick-
ened."' 7  The American view continued to treat the unborn infant as
a living child for the benefit of its property interests.' As a practical
matter, the protection given by the law of property was contingent on
the successful birth of the fetus. It was not until that time that the
property interests the law had protected during fetal existence actually
vested in the infant.
In equity, recognition has been given to prenatal life through the ap-
pointment of a guardian to secure prenatal interests in both person
and property.' The most persuasive individual case illustrating recog-
nition of a fetal right to life concerned the appointment of a guardian
to give consent to a blood transfusion necessary to save the life of the
unborn child despite religious objections on the part of the mother
and father. 10
At common law it was impossible for an unborn infant to be the ob-
ject of the crime of homicide." The term "homicide" was defined as
3. Doe v. Clark, 126 Eng. Rep. 617 (C.P. 1798).
4. Thelluson v. Woodford, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (C.P. 1798).
5. Id. at 163.
6. Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. (15 Pick) 255 (1834).
7. Id. at 258. A fetus has quickened when movement is felt within the mother's
womb. This movement usually occurs four and one-half to five months into the preg-
nancy. S'rIDAM'S MEDICAL DIc'TioNARY (2d ed., 1966).
8. See, D. Louisell, Abortion and Due Process, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 233, 233-237
(1969).
9. Id. at 243-244.
10. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421,
201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
11. See, Winfield, The Unborn Child, 8 CAMB. LJ. 76 (1944), where the de-
velopment of the English criminal law is traced.
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the killing of one human being by another. 12 In that no human being
was considered as being in existence until birth, there could be no hu-
man death when an unborn child was killed by an act that would oth-
erwise have amounted to criminal homicide.13  However, the killing of
a quickened fetus was considered a misdemeanor.' 4 Further, a person
could be guilty of homicide if the injuries inflicted on the quickened
fetus by his acts caused the death of the child after it had been born
alive.' 5 The common law view that an unborn child cannot be the ob-
ject of the crime of murder has carried over into modern times.' 6 But
several state legislatures have incorporated the crime of feticide into
their criminal codes.' 7 This crime is committed when an individual
acts with the intent to kill the mother of a quickened child, but suc-
ceeds only in killing the child.'"
The right of a fetus to continued life and development within its
mother's womb is most often discussed today in the context of the mas-
sive assault being made on the constitutionality of state anti-abortion
statutes. At common law, no crime took place when an abortion was
performed before the quickening, and, even after quickening an abor-
tion was punishable only as a misdemeanor.'" But nineteenth century
legislation eliminated the quickening requirement and made all abor-
tions punishable as felonies.20 It has been submitted, however, that
the legislative interest in these statutes focused more intently on the
elimination of back-alley abortionists and the safety of the mother than
on any right of the fetus in continued normal development within the
mother's womb. 2'
Twelve courts have recently heard cases challenging the constitu-
tionality of state anti-abortion statutes that prohibit non-therapeutic
abortions at any stage of pregnancy. The courts have been willing to
render decisions based on the constitutional merits of these cases.
12. 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide sec. 1.
13. 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide sec. 9.
14. I BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 129-130 (1765).
15. Id.
16. See generally, Annot., Homicide Based on the Killing of an Unborn Child,
40 A.L.R.3d 444 (1971). See also, Keller v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617 (1970).
17. See e.g., Mo. REV. STATS.
18. Passley v. State, 194 Ga. 327, 21 S.E.2d 230 (1942); State v. Harness, 280
S.W.2d 11 (Mo., 1955).
19. See, D. Louisell, supra note 8 at 238-240.
20. In the United States, Illinois passed the first restrictive statute. ILL. REV.
CODE sec. 46, at 131 (1827).
21. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 964-67, 458 P.2d 194, 200-02, 80 Cal. Rptr.
354, 360-62 (1969).
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Four of the courts have upheld the applicable abortion statute2 2 while
the other eight have struck down the existing statute.23
The arguments presented by the parties to these cases are generally
similar. The typical argument made against the constitutionality of
these anti-abortion statutes is that a woman possesses a fundamental
constitutional right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. This right
has been characterized as a right of family or marital privacy or a right
of personal physical integrity in a woman. The foundation of this
right is said to lie either within the text of the Bill of Rights itself or
within those fundamental rights that are necessarily incident to the Bill
of Rights as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut.24 It is argued that the state may not infringe on
this right unless it shows a compelling and overriding state interest.
The state's argument then is that the protection of the unborn human
life provides a sufficient basis to override all non-vital interests in the
mother.
The four courts that upheld the constitutionality of the applicable
statute agreed with the state's argument and found that the fetal right
to development was stronger than the mother's claimed right to an
abortion. The courts in Steinberg v. Brown25 and Minnesota v. Hodg-
son2 found that the fetal right to "life" under the due process clause
was stronger than any right in the mother short of her own right to life.
In Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners2 7 and Corkey
v. Edwards,28 the courts were unwilling to overturn the legislative pol-
22. Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217
(E.D. La. 1970), appeal docketed; Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio
1970); Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971); Minnesota v. Hodg-
son (Minnesota District Court, Second Judicial District, June 29, 1970) (unreported),
a/I'd - Minn. - (1970), appeal dismissed, cert. denied.
23. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969),
cert. denied 397 U.S. 915 (1970); United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C.
1969), rev'd 402 U.S. 26 (1971); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.
1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1, judgment vacated and remanded on appeal,
402 U.S. 903; Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), jur. post. 402
U.S. 941; Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970) appeal dismissed sub.
nom.; Commonwealth v. Page, reported in 8 Cr. L. 2222 (Centre City Pa. Corn.
Pleas Ct., Nov. 27, 1970); State v. Munson (So. Dak. Circuit Crt., Pennington
County, April 6, 1970) (unreported except for excerpt added to dissenting opinion,
Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1245 (E.D.
La. 1970) ).
24. 381 U.S. 479 (1966). In Griswold, the Court struck down a Connecticut
anti-contraception statute on the ground that a right to privacy existed within the
penumbra of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the right to choose whether or
not to have children was necessarily incident to that right of privacy.
25. 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
26. Minnesota District Court, Second Judicial District, County of Ramsey, June
29, 1970 (unreported).
27. 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970).
28. 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
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icy of protecting the fetal right to life as evidenced by the anti-abortion
statute.
But the courts that found in favor of the woman's right to secure
an abortion have necessarily assigned an inferior value to fetal life. In
People v, Belous, 29 the California Supreme Court expressly rejected
any equality between prenatal and postnatal life. And in the most re-
cent federal decision, the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois found that a woman has a fundamental right of choice under
the Constitution to determine whether or not she will bear children.
Thus, the federal court in Doe v. Scott3" held that the Illinois anti-
abortion statute was null and void as it restricted or prohibited the per-
formance of abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy.
But a study of the decisions favoring the woman's right to secure an
abortion reveals that even these courts do not believe that fetal inter-
ests are absolutely inferior to the interest in the mother that has been
recognized as a fundamental constitutional right. For none of these
courts found that the state could not show a compelling interest in pro-
tecting the continued life of a viable fetus. Indeed most of the courts
found that the mother's right to an abortion was stronger than any
state interest in giving protection to early fetal life, not advanced fetal
life. This is significant, for the abortion problem is one of the few
areas of the law where the fetal right to life and physical security is
directly in issue. The decisions favoring a woman's right to choose to
destroy that life during its early stages have obliquely recognized that
the fetal right to life may become so sufficiently strong during its ad-
vanced stages that the state may protect it despite the fact that such
protection would come in direct conflict with her right to control her
personal physical integrity.
THE PURPOSE OF TORT LAW AND THE DENIAL OF DEATH ACTIONS AT
COMMON LAW-WRONGFUL DEATH TO THE RESCUE
Two principles emerged from the English common law that denied
any civil action to recover damages for the death of a human being.
These two principles are:
1. Actio personalis moritur cum persona-a personal action dies
with the person of either the plaintiff or the defendant.
29. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
30. 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. IlI. 1971).
Vol. 3: 402
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2. The killing of a human being is not a ground for action for
damages."1
Although these principles were universally followed in Anglo-Ameri-
can jurisdictions, commentators have been unable to justify either their
existence or their worth. 2
The practical injustices which were worked by denying death ac-
tions are obvious. First, the beneficiaries of the deceased received no
compensation for the harm that they had suffered in the loss of ser-
vices that the deceased provided for them. Had the deceased survived,
they would have been compensated through the common law damage
remedy that the law gives a person who suffered physical injuries and
survived. The second injustice was that the tortfeasor was not made
to bear the consequences of his acts when death was their result. Con-
ceptually, these principles worked against, rather than with, the basic
purpose of tort law-the allocation of losses arising out of normal hu-
man activity. 3  Through the denial of a damage remedy, the common
law took the incongruous position that death was not a loss. But an in-
dividual can suffer no greater loss than the loss of his life. Still, at
31. See, T. Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13
VAND. L. REV. 605 (1960).
32. See, 1 POLLICK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 46-48 (2d ed.
1899); 2 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 51-52; Holdsworth, The Origin
of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REV. 431, 436-37 (1916). These commenta-
tors believe that both rules are founded more on historical than logical bases, and even
as to the historical basis there is some confusion as to the origin of the rules. It is
submitted that the first rule hearkens back to the early days of the common law when
damages for personal injury were regarded as a matter of personal vengeance and
not as a matter of compensation for loss. Thus when either party died before a judg-
ment was rendered, there was no need to satisfy the victim's interests in retribution
nor was there any legal capability to punish the dead transgressor. But since modem
ideas find compensation and not retribution as the key reason for awarding personal
injury damages, the reason that supports the rule is obsolete and no logical basis for
the rule's continued life exists. As to the second rule, the commentators agree that
it grew out of the confusion of Lord Ellenborough, the English judge who announced
that the death of a human being could not be considered as an injury in civil courts
in the case of Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). It is sub-
mitted by the commentators that Lord Ellenborough's decision was based on application
of the common law criminal doctrine that any private action arising from an injury
caused during the commission of a felony merged into the crown's criminal proceed-
ings against the transgressor. In that the wrong complained of in the Baker case
was not felonious, the commentators suggest that the decision in the case was
clearly erroneous. This error and judicial notions that no person could suffer a loss
as a result of the death of another person constituted the only bases for this principle.
Thus the second principle should also fail in that the reasons supporting it are
founded on judicial error and misconception.
It is interesting to note, however, that later courts that could not find sound rea-
sons to sustain these principles constructed their own rationalizations for them so as
not to be forced into a position where they would be faced with the task of repudiating
the principles. One such court, Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180 (1867), refused to
allow damages for wrongful death on the ground that such damages would work to put
a price on human life, a valuation that the court found so revolting that it entered into
a long dissertation on the priceless value of life in Christian civilizations.
33. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 6 (4th ed. 1971).
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common law, neither the decedent nor his beneficiaries were allowed
any compensation from the tortfeasor for the harm that they had suf-
fered as a result of his actions.
These common law principles remained in effect in Anglo-American
jurisdictions until Parliament passed the first Wrongful Death Act 4 in
1846. This statute created a right of action in the personal representa-
tive of the decedent against the person whose acts caused the harm,
and against whom the decedent would have had an action if he had
not died. Generally, the wrongful death statutes of modem times are
still patterned after the original British statute, although each jurisdic-
tion has evolved its own rules, and thus certain variances and inconsist-
encies do exist among the various American states.3 5
Wrongful death legislation has prevented the two common law prin-
ciples from limiting the ability of tort law to recognize death as a loss.
The statutes created a remedy for tortiously caused death. Through
this remedy, the law of torts was able to give recognition to the fact
that a loss had occurred when human life was lost at the hands of a
tortfeasor. The statutes allowed those dependent on the decedent for
support to be made whole to the extent of the financial value of that
support.3 6 Further, the interests of justice were advanced in that the
tortfeasor was made to bear the consequences of his acts.
THE LAW OF TORTS; REMEDIES FOR PRENATAL INJURIES
Early American tort law gave no protection to any fetal interest, for
it did not recognize the fetus as a separate entity from the mother until
birth took place.17  Thus any injury to the fetus was properly recovera-
ble only by the mother. The last twenty-six years, however, have
shown a striking reversal in this thinking.
This reversal began with the landmark decision of Bonbrest v.
Katz.38  The action in Bonbrest grew out of injuries suffered by an in-
fant as a result of the alleged malpractice on the part of a physician.
The defendants relied on the common law view that the fetus was part
34. Fatal Accidents Act (Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 VIcT. c. 93 (1846).
35. J. Horsley, Wrongful Death Act, U. ILL. L. FORUM 93, 95 (1967).
36. But it is interesting to note that prior to 1967 in Illinois, there was a statutory
limit on the amount of damages that were recoverable in a wrongful death action.
At the time the limit on damages was removed, the maximum recovery allowed by
the statute was $30,000. Under the current statute, however, all limits have been
removed. Such limits do remain in other jurisdictions however. In regard to the
Illinois Wrongful Death Act, see, J. Horsley, supra, note 35.
37. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
38. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
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of the mother until birth and thus could suffer no legal injury until
birth. But the court found that scientific advances made it impossible
for the law to continue to view the fetus who was en ventre sa mere as
a part of the mother. Thus the court found itself compelled to recog-
nize an action on the part of a viable fetus who suffered prenatal in-
juries and was subsequently born alive.
Since the Bonbrest decision, the overwhelming majority of American
courts have adopted the view that an infant who is born alive can bring
an action for any injuries it suffered in utero as a result of the tortious
conduct of a third partyA9  Although the infant's action was at first
limited to those infants who were viable at the time of their injury,4"
the modern trend is to allow a common law action in tort to an infant
who is born bearing injuries suffered at the hands of a tortfeasor at
any time during its fetal existence.4
The question of allowing an action under state wrongful death stat-
utes to the personal representative of a viable fetus who died in utero
as a result of tortious conduct has left courts sharply divided.4 2 In the
jurisdictions that have ruled on the question prior to the instant case,
fifteen have allowed the action and twelve have denied it.43
39. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 336 (4th ed. 1971).
40. Bonbrest v. Katz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch,
197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Amman v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412
(1953).
41. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956);
Daley v. Meier, 33 I11. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Bennet v. Hymers,
101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497
(1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953); Sinkler v.
Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Sylvia v. Goebille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I.
1960).
42. See generally, Annot. 15 A.L.R.3d 449 (1970); Note, Wrongful Death and
the Stillborn Fetus-A Current Analysis, 7 HoUsT. L. REV. 449 (1970).
43. Jurisdictions allowing recovery: Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256,
181 A.2d 448 (1962); Wargan v. Greggo & Gerrar, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557
(1956); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa, 1960); Hale v. Manion, 189
Kan. 143, 368 P.2d.1 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Valence
v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1951); State, Use of
Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Verkennes v. Corniea,
229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d
434 (1954); White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1969); Poliquin v. MacDonald
101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167
N.E.2d 106 (1959); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964);
Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W. Va. 1969); Kwaterski v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
See also, Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955), where the
court found that a non-viable fetus's tortiously caused stillbirth was allowed to be the
basis of a wrongful death action.
Jurisdictions denying recovery: Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d
178 (1954); Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); Torigan
v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967); Estate of Powers
v. Troy, 4 Mich. App. 572, 145 N.W.2d 418, aff'd, 380 Mich. 160, 156 N.W.2d 530
(1968); Acton v. Shields, 386 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1965); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co.,
409
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A number of different theories have been used to support the denial
of the action. The theory most often utilized is that an unborn child
lacks legal personality and thus cannot qualify as a "person" or "de-
cedent" under applicable wrongful death statutes." The second
ground used to deny the action is that there could be no evidence from
which to infer the pecuniary loss suffered by the decedent's benefici-
aries, a necessary element in wrongful death actions in many jurisdic-
tions.45 The third ground used is that the child's mother is adequately
compensated for her loss through her own action, and that the allow-
ance of a remedy under the wrongful death statute would be punitive
in nature in providing for double recovery."
Courts that allow the action also use several different arguments to
support their decisions. The first ground is that a viable fetus is a liv-
ing human being and thus is within the purview of wrongful death stat-
utes.47 The second argument made is that it is too arbitrary to make
liability for prenatal injuries depend on whether death occurs just be-
fore or just after birth.48 The third theory is that the inability to prove
damages supporting an action is not a proper reason for the denial of
the action.49
But, although courts on both sides of the issue have set forth numer-
ous theories to support their holdings, the key issue in these cases is
whether or not the viable fetus has a legal personality. If this question
is answered in the affirmative, then the action is allowed. If it is an-
swered in the negative, no action is found to exist. The other argu-
155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140
(1964); Endresz v. Friedburg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969); Gray v.
Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Padillo v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla.
1967); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964); Durret v. Owens, 212
Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963).
44. E.g., Endresz v. Friedburg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969); Keyes v.
Construction Services Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); Hogan v. McDaniel,
204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17,
50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
45. Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Acton v. Shields,
386 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1965); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964).
46. Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Carroll v. Skloff,
415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964).
47. E.g., Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Stidam v.
Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d
901 (Ky. 1955); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954).
48. State, Use of Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 448 (1964);
Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
49. Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Fowler v.
Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901
(Ky. 1955). Aside from the problem of damages, these courts also have found that
problems of proof as to the proximate cause of the fetal death will not serve to defeat
the bringing of the action for wrongful death.
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ments are persuasive, but they only serve to buttress the court's deter-
mination of the issue of legal personality.
THE ILLINOIS POSITION PRIOR TO Chrisafogeorgis
The right of an infant to recover damages for prenatal injuries was
not recognized in Illinois until 1953 in the case of Amman v. Faidy.50
In that landmark decision, the Illinois Supreme Court found that a via-
ble fetus who was injured while en ventre sa mere had a cause of action
after birth for the injuries it had sustained. Mr. Justice Schaefer, in
delivering the opinion of the court, found that an unborn viable child
should not be regarded as a part of the mother as it had been in the
earlier decision of Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital.5 He noted that the
law recognizes the separate existence of an unborn child for the pur-
poses of protecting its property rights and protecting it against crimi-
nal conduct. Thus, the law of torts should also recognize the separate
existence and separate life of a viable fetus. Further, the court found
that upon making that recognition, the law of torts in Illinois must also
recognize that a child has the legal right "[t]o commence life unim-
paired by physical or mental defects caused by the negligence of oth-
ers while it was en ventre sa mere."'5 2 The court found that if no recog-
nition was given to this right, a wrong would be allowed for which there
would be no remedy. However, the court's opinion expressly limited
any action for prenatal injuries to children who were viable at the time
of injury and who were subsequently born alive.
Eight years after the Amman decision, two Illinois appellate courts
extended the supreme court's recognition of fetal life within the mother
to create actions in infants who were not yet viable at the time of their
injury.55 These two courts found that the viability of the child at the
time of the injury was not the crucial issue in prenatal injury actions.
As far as these courts were concerned, the ability to bring an action
for prenatal injuries turned on the successful birth of the child.
The most recent Illinois case discussing the problems of prenatal in-
juries was Rapp v. Hiemenz.54 In the Rapp case, a wrongful death ac-
tion by the personal representative of a non-viable fetus was denied.
The appellate court for the Second District found again that viability
50. 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
51. 184 Il. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
52. 415 Ill. 422, 428, 114 N.E.2d 412, 416 (1953).
53. Daley v. Meier, 33 1l1. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Sana v.
Brown, 35 I. App. 2d 425, 183 N.E.2d 187 (1962).
54. 107 Il. App. 2d 382, 246 N.E.2d 77 (1969).
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was not the crucial issue and that any action for prenatal injuries de-
pended on the live birth of the child.
Although three appellate courts have interpreted Amman as requir-
ing successful birth before an action for prenatal injuries will lie, the
Amman recognition of the separate life of an -unborn but viable fetus
is still important in considering the right of recovery under the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act. The importance becomes apparent on an exam-
ination of the statute which reads:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful
act . . . and the act . . . is such as would, if death had not en-
sued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and
recover damages in respect thereof, then . . . the person who
. . . would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be
liable to an action for damages . . .. 55 (Emphasis added.)
If the existence of the fetus as recognized in Amman is a recognition
of the legal personality of the viable fetus, then the viable fetus must be
considered a "person" under the Wrongful Death Act and the action
would have to be allowed.56
But legal personality has not been the sole reason for denial of the
right to bring wrongful death actions for negligently caused stillbirth.
The problem of proving pecuniary loss has also been an important fac-
tor. Recovery -under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act is limited to pe-
cuniary loss. 57 Pecuniary loss in Illinois is measured by the personal
characteristics, prospects, habits and earnings of the decedent.58 But
what are the personal characteristics, prospects, habits and earnings of
a stillborn child? In Butler v. Manhattan Railway Co., Judge Andrews
found that when an infant has been born alive, certain facts are prova-
ble, i.e., the age, sex, mental and physical condition, bodily strength,
and promise for the future. In the case of a stillborn child, however,
Judge Andrews stated:
There are no elements whatever upon which a jury could base any
conclusion that a pecuniary injury has been suffered by the plain-
tiff from loss of the unborn child, and this inquiry should have
been excluded from the jury as too remote and speculative to
form an element in the recovery. 59
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, sec. 1 (1971).
56. At least one court and one commentator had predicted that Illinois would
allow wrongful death actions for the tortiously caused stillbirth of viable fetuses. See,
Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 16, 148 N.W.2d 107,
110 (1967); R. Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts; Actions for Wrongful Death,
15 RUTGERS L. REv. 61, 73 (1961).
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, sec. 2 (1971).
58. Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Il1. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928); Zastautas v. St. Anthony
de Padua Hospital, 23 Il. 2d 326, 178 N.E.2d 303 (1961).
59. 143 N.Y. 417, 421, 38 N.E. 454, 455 (1894).
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Still, it is well established in Illinois that where a decedent leaves
direct lineal or next of kin, whether the decedent is an adult or a child,
there is a presumption that the surviving lineal and next of kin have
suffered a substantial pecuniary loss.6" Further, an examination of
Illinois cases concerning wrongful death actions for the death of chil-
dren reveals that Illinois courts have consistently upheld large awards
despite restrictions in the statute concerning the specific elements that
have pecuniary value. 61  Emphasis has been placed on the presump-
tion of substantial loss suffered by the next of kin of the decedent.
And although Illinois has not recognized a parental loss in the loss of
the society and companionship of deceased children,6 2 it is likely that
juries do consider this as an element of recovery in such cases. It also
appears that the Illinois courts sanction this consideration by upholding
the large awards given for the wrongful death of children despite the
speculative nature of the damages involved.6
Although wrongful death recovery in Illinois is limited by statute to
pecuniary losses, courts have not interfered with the function of the
jury in fixing the amount of the damage award where that award has
been the maximum amount recoverable.64 If the personal representa-
tive can show enough facts about the fetus to support the presumption
of substantial loss to the next of kin, then a court would be bound to
ask the jury to render a damage award. Judge Andrews' statement
is still valid, however, and it appears that the personal representative
will be able to show little more than the sex of the unborn child and
possibly its health during its earlier prenatal development. It is ques-
tionable whether this showing will be sufficient to support the pre-
sumption.
60. Howlett v. Doglio, 402 I11. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949).
61. Denning v. City of Chicago, 321 Ill. 341, 151 N.E. 886 (1926), where a
recovery for the statutory maximum in the case of a nine year old was upheld; Petro-
vic v. City of Chicago, 251 Ill. App. 542 (1929), where a recovery for the statutory
maximum in the case of a year old was upheld; American National Bank & T. Co. v.
People's Gas Co., 42 Ill. App. 2d 163, 191 N.E.2d 628 (1963), where a recovery for
the statutory maximum in the case of a three year old was upheld; Maca v. Rock
Island-Moline City Lines, Inc., 47 Il1. App. 2d 31, 197 N.E.2d 463 (1964), where a re-
covery for the statutory maximum in the case of seven year old was upheld. Of par-
ticular interest is Wallace v. City of Rock Island, 323 Ill. App. 639, 56 N.E.2d 636
(1944), where the court reversed an award of $500 nominal damages in an action for
the wrongful death of a thirteen year old boy. Such a nominal damage award
could not be allowed to stand in the opinion of the court when consideration is given to
the presumption of substantial loss to lineal next of kin. Damages awarded for the
wrongful death of children were not to be based on fixed mathematical formulas, but
rather on the basis of "reasonable probability."
62. E. Pavalon, Damages-Wrongful Death of Children, 50 CHI. BA. REC. 84
(1968).
63. See cases cited supra, note 61.
64. Id.
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THE Chrisafogeorgis DECISION
In the instant case, the court first examined the Illinois Wrongful
Death Act and determined that initial inquiry must be made to deter-
mine whether Baby Boy could have maintained his own suit against the
defendants if he had survived. Mr. Justice Lorenz, writing for the court
reviewed Amman 5 and its progeny and concluded that Baby Boy
would have had such an action. The only question that then re-
mained to be decided was whether a viable fetus had acquired the legal
personality to bring it within the language of the statute which requires
the "death of a person" as a condition precedent to recovery. The
court then chose to refer to decisions from New York and Ohio to aid
it in its determination of the legal personality issue.
The first case considered was the New York decision of Endresz v.
Friedburg wherein a viable fetus was found not to be a "decedent"
under that state's wrongful death statute.66 The Endresz court took
notice of the contingent nature of the protection afforded the property
rights of the fetus by the common law, and determined that the law of
torts should offer similar protection. Mr. Justice Lorenz quoted from
the Endresz opinion in regard to this point:
[T]here is but a "conditional prospective liability ... created
when an unborn child . . . is injured" through the wrongful act of
the defendant, and such liability attaches only upon fulfillment of
the condition that the child be born alive. 67
The court next gave consideration to the decision of the Ohio Su-
preme Court in the case of State v. Dickinson where a viable fetus was
held not to be a "person" under that state's vehicular homicide stat-
ute.68  Thus no criminal responsibility attached to the defendant who
had caused it to be stillborn. The Ohio court took note of the com-
mon law status of an unborn child as set forth in the oft-quoted state-
ment by Lord Coke; Mr. Justice Lorenz also set forth this mid-seven-
teenth century statement which reads:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise kill-
eth it in her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a
great misprision, and no murder; but if the childe be born alive
and dyeth of the potion, battery or some other cause, this is mur-
65. See text at p. 411, supra.
66. 24 N.Y.2d 478, 246 N.E.2d 901 (1969).
67. Id. at 486, 246 N.E.2d at 903.
68. 28 Ohio St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971). But see Stidam v. Ashmore,
109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959), where a viable fetus was deemed to have
legal personality for the purpose of allowing a wrongful death action as a result of its
tortiously caused stillbirth.
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der; for in the law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum
natura, when it is born alive. 69
The Illinois court then dismissed the plaintiff's argument that since
life begins at some time before birth according to biology, the viable
fetus should be regarded as a "person" under the Wrongful Death Act.
It found that "the fetus does not become a 'person' as that term is or-
dinarily understood until the instant of birth." Thus the court found
that it would be indulging in fiction if it were allow the action. It solid-
ified this position by reviewing the prior Illinois case law on prenatal
injuries, and noted that each decision required successful birth as a
condition precedent to recovery of damages. The court recognized
that other jurisdictions had allowed the action, but found the rationale
supporting those decisions to be "unpersuasive." Thus it reached the
conclusion that the trial court's dismissal of the action should be af-
firmed.
The court also noted that it could be impossible to prove any pe-
cuniary loss as a result of the stillbirth, but stated that it had rendered
its decision without turning its attention to the damage problem. The
opinion closed with the court acknowledging that the plaintiff had at-
tempted to argue that the court's construction of the Wrongful Death
Act was unconstitutional under both the Illinois and Federal constitu-
tions. The plaintiff's argument was that a construction of the Wrongful
Death Act that allowed an action where the child was born alive, but
denied it where the child died just before birth, denied equal protection
to the interests of the unborn child and its parents. The court, however,
refused to hear this argument because the plaintiff had not raised it at
the trial level.70
CONCLUSION-WHERE LIES THE REMEDY?
A family that loses a child before it is born suffers a very grievous
loss for which money damages are really inadequate. It is only
equitable that a family should receive some compensation from a
tortfeasor whose negligence caused the loss of a child. 71
Partly on the basis of this rationale, a suit for the wrongful death
of a viable fetus was allowed in Wisconsin. While it is true that tradi-
69. 3 COKE, INsTTtrEs 58 (1648).
70. The court cited Meyers v. Board of Education (121 I11. App. 2d 186, 257
N.E.2d 183 (1970) ), as authority for action. In the Meyers case, the plaintiff's
attempt to raise a constitutional issue on appeal for the first time was allowed to be
stricken from the record on the defendant's motion.
71. Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. CO., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d
107 (1967).
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tional notions of justice and fairness require that the tortfeasor com-
pensate the parents for causing the loss of their unborn child, it is sub-
mitted that the Chrisafogeorgis court made the proper decision in find-
ing that a wrongful death action was an inappropriate method of at-
taining this compensation. Regardless of the fact that Baby Boy could
have brought his own action if he had not died prior to birth, no
wrongful death action on behalf of his next of kin could be maintained
until it was determined that he had the legal personality required by the
statute. The Chrisafogeorgis result comes then not as a vestige of the
common law principles that denied any action for the death of a human
being, but rather as a manifestation of the legal view that full human
life and personality does not begin until birth.
As illustrated by the court and the preceding discussion, the com-
mon law did not regard the viable fetus as having a separate legal per-
sonality. Further, prior Illinois case law had subscribed to this view.
The Amman decision did find that a viable fetus was a separate life
within the mother, but the legal recognition of prenatal life did not
work to confer legal personality and its attendant tort protection on the
viable fetus. It worked only to create a basis for the right of an infant
to commence its postnatal or "legal" life without any mental or physical
defects resulting from injuries sustained while it was in utero. Thus
Illinois tort law had recognized the scientific fact that life begins before
birth, but it simultaneously continued to support the traditional com-
mon law view that prenatal life is something less than full human life.
But the legal equation of postnatal life with full human life has been
attacked as being scientifically incorrect." Biologically, human life
begins at conception and an individual's personality traits begin form-
ing shortly thereafter. Science regards birth not as a beginning of life,
but rather as a bridge between prenatal and postnatal life.7" Those
courts that have allowed wrongful death actions for stillborn children
have relied heavily on this scientific view in regard to the issue of legal
personality.7 4
Yet these decisions do not recognize legal personality as attaching
72. Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 at 746 (N.D. Ohio 1970). See, Corkey
v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (W.D.N.C. 1971) where the court accepted the
scientific view that life begins at birth.
73. A. MONTAGU, LIFE BEFORE BroTi, at 221 (1965).
74. See cases cited supra, note 43. But medical knowledge about prenatal life was
utilized to a greater extent in the non-statutory actions for prenatal torts where the
child was born with mental or physical defects caused by injuries sustained while the
child was in utero. D. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MicH. L. REV. 579, 588-90
(1965).
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at conception.7 5 The courts have limited the action to personal repre-
sentatives of fetuses who were viable at the time of the injury that
caused their stillbirth. In theory, these courts have failed to give full
recognition to the scientific view that life begins at conception. Rather
they have found that legal personality begins at the time when the fetus
has the capability to survive outside of its mother's womb. Only those
courts that have supported the constitutionality of anti-abortion statutes
prohibiting abortions at any stage of pregnancy have adopted the sci-
entific and moral view that full human life begins at conception r.7
Wihile it is true that medical science has shown that the viable fetus
can live independent from its mother, the fact is that the viable fetus
does not live independent from its mother. Its capability of independ-
ent survival is an untested potential ability. And although medical sci-
ence can accelerate the birth of a viable fetus and the corresponding
attachment of legal personality, it should not be able to provide au-
thority for the position that a viable unborn child is an independently
existing person.7 The law looks for hard lines as to when liability will
arise and when it will not. It deals with actuality and not potentiality
-the known and not the unknown. 78  Birth is a concrete and tangible
event. The newborn infant is clearly an independent person while the
independent personality of a viable fetus is merely a potentiality. Even
science is -unable to deny that prenatal and postnatal life are materially
different states of existence, the key difference being the independent
existence of the newborn infant.
The position of the Chrisafogeorgis court in regarding prenatal life
as potential life gains further support from the semantics of birth. For
while science instructs that life begins at conception, the ideas of our
culture as reflected in our language indicate that life is thought to be-
gin at birth. For the mother and father of a fetus are said to be "ex-
pectant" parents and this "expectancy" does not end until the child is
born. Thus the court's adoption of "conditional prospective liability"
in regard to the responsibility of a tortfeasor in causing prenatal injury
is reflective of the attitudes of our culture concerning unborn human
life.
75. See cases cited supra, note 43. But see Porter v. Lassiter, where the zygote
was found capable of being the object of a wrongful death action pursuant to a state
criminal statute.
76. See cases cited supra, note 23.
77. Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 243, 319 S.W.2d 221, 224 (1958);
Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 23, 50 N.W.2d 229, 236 (1951).
78. T. Clark, Religion, Morality and Abortion: A Constitutional Appraisal, 2
LOYoLA (Los ANGELES) L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1969).
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But as noted above, the wrongful death action is a statutory remedy
created to compensate the next of kin of the decedent for the loss that
they suffered as a result of the death. It is submitted that the loss suf-
fered by Baby Boy's parents would have been no greater if Baby Boy
had not been stillborn, but rather had lived for only a few minutes after
his birth. Yet because death occurred prior to birth, no action can be
allowed for the child's death. Thus, it has been argued that the birth
limitation on legal personality is an arbitrary and unreasonable limita-
tion that works to deny equal protection to the interests of a parent of
a child who is killed just prior to birth. The proponents of this argu-
ment would have courts adopt the viability limitation on legal personality.
The law, however, requires clear cut lines marking the time when
legal personality begins."9 The line between prenatal and postnatal
existence is much more definite than the line between viability and
non-viability. The fact of independent visible existence measured
against the potentiality of such existence gives a reasonable basis for
the birth limitation. And although some injustice will result from the
birth limitation, it has been argued that some injustice will always result
where lines have to be drawn. s0 Thus the injustice created by the
birth limitation as applied in the instant case would most probably
have not compelled the court to reverse the trial court's denial of the
wrongful death action on equal protection grounds even had the court
been in a position to do so.
Thus, it is submitted that the court made the proper decision in af-
firming the trial court's denial of the wrongful death action on the
ground that the fetus, even though viable at the time of injury, did not
have the legal personality required by the Illinois Wrongful Death Act.
But to conclude discussion at this point is to overlook the fact that the
parents have suffered a very great loss through the tortious killing of
their child.8l Yet if they are denied wrongful death compensation as
they must be under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, what damages
79. L. Stewart, The Case of the Prenatal Injury, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 527, 537
(1963); D. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 579, 593 (1965). This
probably was the gist of the plaintiff's equal protection argument that was not al-
lowed to be raised on appeal in the instant case.
80. 2 HARPER AND JONES, TORTS, secs. 18 & 3, at 1031 (1956).
81. But can the stillbirth be said to be tortiously caused? For under the court's
interpretation, there was no duty on the part of the defendants to act in due care
with regard to the fetal interest in continued prenatal life. Yet, even if no tort was
committed against the unborn child, the actions that caused the stillbirth were tortious
as to the mother, a person to whom the defendants clearly owed a duty of due care,
and thus it can be validly said that the death of Baby Boy Chrisafogeorgis was
"tortiously caused." Still, however, the court found that, as to Baby Boy, there was
no tortious act on the part of the defendants.
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can they recover? Mrs. Chrisafogeorgis will clearly have an action for
the physical injuries and pain and suffering that resulted from the neg-
ligence of the defendants. Further she should also be able to recover
for the mental anguish, emotional shock and psychological trauma
traceable to the physical injuries she suffered in the accident. 2  But
neither she nor her husband will be able to be compensated for what
has amounted to a clear interference with the exercise of their right to
have children and raise a family.
It has been argued, however, that the parents have no interest in
protecting their unborn children from tortiously caused stillbirth. The
proponents of this argument point to the fact that the parents suffer
no financial loss as a result of the stillbirth. 3 They even assert, and
not incorrectly, that the stillbirth could well amount to a financial sav-
ings. Because of these facts, it is argued that the only loss suffered
by the parents of an unborn child tortiously killed before birth is a sen-
timental or emotional loss. In that tort law has always balked at ren-
dering damage awards to compensate hurt feelings, it is contended that
awarding parents damages in this case would be punitive and not com-
pensatory and thus contrary to the general purposes of tort law."'
Further, in that the parents have suffered no financial loss, it has been
submitted that giving them damages for the stillbirth of their unborn
children would constitute a "windfall" to them.
But these arguments centering on the sentimental loss and lack of
pecuniary injury involved in the tortious stillbirth of an unborn child
overlook the nature of the interest sought to be protected. This inter-
est is the seemingly fundamental right of all married couples-the right
to have children and raise families. In light of the United States Su-
preme Court's pronouncements in Griswold v. Connecticut85 and the
abortion cases that have construed Griswold,8 this right has clear con-
stitutional dimensions. For Griswold decided that a constitutional
right to privacy fell within the penumbra of rights guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, and thus a married couple had the right to choose not to
have children through the use of birth control devices that would pre-
vent conception. This right was extended so as to allow a pregnant
82. 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, see. 125.
83. Wenger, Developments in the Law of Prenatal Wrongful Death, 69 DICK. L.
REv. 258, 268 (1965).
84. W. Schwartz, Liability for Prenatal Injuries Causing Stillbirth, 26 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 134, 136 (1964); M. BELLI, TRIAL AND TORT TRENs at 93 (1960); D. Gordon,
The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REv. 579, 594-95 (1963).
85. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
86. See cases cited supra, notes 23 & 24.
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woman to exercise her choice not to have children even after conception
if the right were exercised during the earlier stages of pregnancy. But,
if Griswold is to stand as the basis for the principle that a woman's
fundamental right to control her body includes the right to prevent or
expell an unwanted pregnancy, should not Griswold also stand as the
basis for a constitutionally protected interest in controlling one's body
for the purpose of begetting and nurturing prenatal life? It is submit-
ted that it should. For if no such right is recognized, the law would
give protection to interests in personal bodily control for the purposes
of preventing and destroying the formation of prenatal life while deny-
ing such protection for the purposes of preserving that life. Such a
position would be anomalous at best.
Thus, if there is a recognition of an interest in the use of one's body
for the purpose of having children, then there would also be a corre-
sponding recognition of a duty in third parties to act with due care so as
not to cause harm to that interest. A breach of this duty would give
rise to an action by the parents for damages.8 7  And, in that the new
Illinois Constitution provides that "Every person shall find a certain
remedy in the law for all wrongs and injuries he receives,"' courts
would appear to be bound to allow parents of a tortiously killed un-
born child to maintain an action for the interference with the right to
have children. Such a decision would eliminate the injustice created
by the Illinois Wrongful Death Act's current inability to support an ac-
tion to compensate the next of kin of a stillborn child for the loss they
suffered as a result of its death.
WILLIAM D. BREJcHA
87. A person has a duty not to permit his activities . . . to create an undue risk
of harm to any protected interest of another. W. Seavey, Principles of Torts,
56 HARv. L. Rav. 72, 87 (1942).
88. ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION, Art. I, see. 12 (Emphasis added). But see, W. Heindl,
A Remedy for All Injuries? 25 Cm. KENT L. REv. 90 (1946), where the words
"wrongs" and "injuries" are said to be technical words to refer to wrongs and injuries
that the law has already recognized as such. Thus, the author concludes that courts
may not use this constitutional provision to create new actions to remedy wrongs
not yet considered to be "legal" wrongs.
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